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Introduction
We thank the commentators on our paper.1–5 We have
learned a great deal from this exchange. These papers do
much to clarify previous statements, and show that there is
much that we agree on. They also show that there remain
important points of disagreement. In this response we do
not expect that we can resolve all these points of disagree-
ment; rather, our intention is to clarify them and our pos-
ition in relation to them.
We approach these commentaries by identifying what
we take to be an authoritative version of the Potential
Outcomes Approach (POA), which we believe that most of
our interlocutors would accept, given what they have writ-
ten. In addition, we define the Restricted Potential
Outcomes Approach (RPOA), which (as we have indicated
from the outset) is characterized by a further commitment
concerning the role of interventions (whether or not hu-
manly feasible). We have concerns about certain aspects of
the POA, but we regard the RPOA as more seriously
mistaken.
Our approach in what follows is to identify, as clearly
as we can, our points of agreement and disagreement on
the substantive elements of the POA and RPOA. Having
dealt with these ‘hard’ theoretical issues, we seek to re-
late these to the various ‘soft’ downstream issues relating
to pedagogy, emphasis, prioritization of study designs
and neglect of important exposures. These ‘soft’ aspects
of the debate are by no means less important—in fact
they may even be more important for the characteristics
that epidemiology takes on as it develops. But if clarity
on the substantive points of agreement and disagreement
can be achieved before discussing the ‘soft’ downstream
issues, then those discussions will be more fair and
fruitful.
The version of the POA that we believe emerges from
the exchange has the following elements.
i. Counterfactual dependence of E on C is not necessary
for C to cause E, but it is sufficient (POA’s Basic
Metaphysical Stance).
ii. Sufficient evidential conditions currently exist for
attributing the counterfactual dependence of E on C,
but necessary conditions currently do not; the POA
identifies some (but not all) of these sufficient condi-
tions (POA’s Basic Epistemological Stance).
iii. Causal inference includes two distinct aspects: causal
identification, in which the truth value of a claim of
the form ‘C causes E’ is determined; and quantitative
causal estimation, in which a numerical value n is esti-
mated for a claim of the form ‘C has n effect on E’ (the
Identification/Estimation Distinction).
iv. Adequately well-defined counterfactual contrasts are
necessary for giving meaning to quantitative estimates
of causal effect (POA’s Semantic Stance on Estimation).
These four elements characterize what we regard as a
‘standard’ version of the POA. Different authors emphasize
different elements of these in their responses to our original
paper and in their writings preceding this discussion.
However, we believe that most of our interlocutors accept
these elements. In his considered and especially clear re-
sponse,4 Tyler VanderWeele touches on almost all of these,
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and is particularly at pains to emphasize that counterfac-
tual dependence may be sufficient for causation even if it is
not necessary, part of (i), and that there is an important
difference between causal identification and quantitative
estimation, as stated in point (iii). Herna´n has emphasized
(iv) in particular, as well as point (v) below.6
Perhaps because of the POA’s resonance with the theor-
etical basis of randomized controlled trials, some have
taken it implicitly to involve interventions. This is not a
logically essential element of PO theory (as we pointed out
in our original paper), and it is certainly not inherent in the
counterfactual approach (as Pearl and others make clear7).
This gives rise to an additional fifth element which, taken
with (i)-(iv), defines the Restricted Potential Outcomes
Approach (RPOA).
(v) Counterfactual contrasts are adequately well-defined if
and only if we can specify a corresponding adequately
well-defined intervention on the putative cause, by
which the counterfactual contrast would be (or would
have been) brought about. (RPOA’s Restriction to
Interventions).
This additional clause imposes both a necessary and a suf-
ficient condition on adequately well-defined counterfactual
contrasts. Herna´n is particularly closely associated with
(v), having made statements to the effect that causal ques-
tions are well-defined when interventions are well-
defined,6 and having critiqued the work of epidemiologists
who do not define interventions.8 However, because the
difference between (i)-(iv) and (i)-(v) is not generally appre-
ciated, all of our interlocutors have at some stage assumed
elements (i)-(v): that is, they have assumed or committed
themselves to the RPOA approach, as we show in Section
B1 below.
It is the additional element involving interventions that
has given rise to the most debate, since ‘intervention’ has
not been defined. In particular, there has been discussion
about whether interventions must be humanly feasible
events or not. However, there are other problems with (v),
even setting aside the matter of human feasibility (that is,
even accepting the recent insistence that ‘intervention’ does
not imply ‘humanly feasible’). We were clear on this in our
original paper and we reiterate this below.
In Part A of this paper, we examine each of (i)-(v).
Roughly speaking, our views are as follows.
• We accept (i).
• We reject (ii) because we do not believe that there are
logically sufficient circumstances for inferring causation.
Causal inference is always inductive, not deductive; un-
less ‘sufficient’ means ‘inductively sufficient’, in which
case we accept (ii) but regard it as misleading because we
were capable of inductive causal inference long before
the POA, or indeed science in general, were conceived.
• We accept (iii) for the sake of the current discussion, i.e.
to be able to explore its consequences.
• We accept (iv) provided that ‘well-defined contrasts’ are
understood in a suitably liberal way, and provided that it
is not confused with the incorrect claim that well-defined
contrasts are sufficient for causal estimation;
• We reject (v) as a mistake. ‘Intervention’ is a misleading
term, suggesting human feasibility when this is appar-
ently not intended, and still without a precise definition
in the present discussion. Moreover, there is no good
reason to focus on interventions (even non-human ones)
when seeking to specify counterfactual contrasts. As
indicated in our original paper): (a) interventions are
not sufficient for well-defined counterfactual contrasts;
(b) we may not always know in advance whether a con-
templated intervention is well-specified; and (c) interven-
tions are not necessary for well-defined counterfactual
contrasts.
We focused on the RPOA in our original paper because we
regard (v) as the most problematic. It is striking that, in
their responses, our critical commentators have only re-
sponded to our discussion of interventions in relation to
human feasibility. Having clarified that they never in-
tended ‘intervention’ to be restricted to humanly feasible
actions, they proceed to other matters. But we were clear
in our original paper9 that there are problems with the role
of interventions in the RPOA even after the assumption of
human feasibility is dropped. We suspect that the differ-
ence between (i)-(iv) and (i)-(v) has simply not been fully
appreciated and that some of our interlocutors slide uncon-
sciously from one to the other, especially when pressed (for
example, when asked for a definition of ‘intervention’).
One of our hopes in this response is to bring this distinc-
tion out more clearly, enabling us to reconcile our rela-
tively benign attitude to the POA (even though we have
serious concerns about some aspects) with our rejection of
the RPOA which we think could restrict and damage epi-
demiology as a science.
In Part B of the paper we turn to more general consider-
ations. In B1 we consider the Straw Man objection, which
we have encountered frequently. At risk of seeming belli-
gerent, we quote earlier passages in which VanderWeele
and Herna´n commit to the RPOA and interpret ‘interven-
tion’ as ‘humanly feasible intervention’. We hesitate to do
this, because ‘who said what and when’ is not strictly rele-
vant to the substantive matters at issue. However, one of
our central concerns with the RPOA concerns lack of clar-
ity: there has been a failure to define key terms (specific-
ally, ‘intervention’), and a failure to distinguish between
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very different assertions (between POA, RPOA, humanly
feasible RPOA). Thus what has been said in recent letters
and commentaries is not equivalent to what was said be-
fore we published our original paper. We believe that per-
ceiving these differences is important for the conceptual
development of the science.
In Section B2 we argue that science is a process and we
reiterate our general view that the POA does not fit easily
into the view of the nature of science that we favour, and
from which we believe epidemiology as a whole has bene-
fited and will continue to benefit.
A. Substantive issues
A1. The POA’s Basic Metaphysical Stance
We regard the POA’s Basic Metaphysical Stance (i) as rea-
sonable. Regarding (i), epidemiologists are not concerned
with metaphysics except insofar as they are forced to take
a metaphysical stance in order to carry on with their work.
We take this to be agreed on all sides in the present debate.
The most obvious way for epidemiologists to proceed,
given that metaphysics is not their day job, is to follow the
broadly accepted consensus among the academic commu-
nity whose day job is the metaphysics of causation, namely
philosophers. Only if that consensus seems unhelpful for
epidemiological purposes need epidemiologists disagree
with the philosophical consensus.
The philosophical consensus agrees with (i) in saying
that effects do not always depend on their causes,10 as
when the president’s death does not depend on the assas-
sin’s shot because there was a back-up assassin who would
have killed the president if the actual killer had missed (or,
had she not smoked, a smoker may have got lung cancer
for other reasons). And the philosophical consensus agrees
with Tyler VanderWeele in particular that if X and Y
occur, and Y counterfactually depends on X, then X causes
Y10 (even though VanderWeele’s use of laws in expressing
this thought differs from the consensus view of the role of
laws in determining the truth conditions of counterfac-
tuals11–14). We too accept (i), for these purposes.
A2. POA’s Basic Epistemological Stance
VanderWeele identifies, as a key point, that ‘there are well
established sufficient conditions for attributing causation
and the potential outcomes framework provides one such
set of sufficient conditions’.4 We understand and unpack
the claim as follows. We can have certain kinds of evidence
which are sufficient for us to attribute causation; and the
POA represents or supplies one such kind (or set of kinds).
Specifically, the POA provides sufficient conditions to at-
tribute counterfactual dependencies, and by (i) evidence
for a counterfactual dependency is likewise evidence for
causation. We suppose that the route must be from evi-
dence via counterfactual dependence to causation, and not
directly from evidence to causation, because it is character-
istic of the POA that it does not concern inferential routes
from evidence to causation that do not specify anything
about counterfactual dependence (although it need not
deny the existence of such routes, as some of the commen-
taries have stressed, notably VanderWeele’s15). We take
this to be accepted on all sides.
The view represented by (ii) is expressed clearly by
VanderWeele when he says that there are well-established
sufficient conditions for attributing causation. It seems
that this view is widely shared among those impressed by
the POA. We suspect that there may be frustration at our
apparent reluctance to accept it, which may even be con-
strued in some quarters as methodological Ludditism, or as
the last gasp of an outmoded way of thinking. Nonetheless
we do not accept the view expressed in VanderWeele’s re-
mark and in (ii) above.
The meaning of VanderWeele’s point depends on the
notion of ‘sufficient’ in play. One interpretation might be
that logical sufficiency is intended. If that is the case, we
deny that logically sufficient conditions exist either for the
attribution of causation or for the attribution of counter-
factual dependence, because all such attributions are the
result of an inductive inference, either directly or
indirectly.
Nancy Cartwright has been at great pains to warn pro-
ponents of evidence-based policy of the dangers of forget-
ting that a conclusion is only as well supported as the
assumptions under which the method of reaching it oper-
ates.16,17 The method itself may be deductive, given the as-
sumptions, and in this sense the causal conclusion is
deduced from the evidence—but the assumptions under-
pinning the method are themselves inductively supported.
These assumptions have very broad scope, and include the
integration of all knowledge from the broader set of evi-
dence that is necessary to set up different studies, the as-
sumption that the data are accurately recorded in the first
place, assumptions about honesty and sobriety of investi-
gators, and many more besides.
One well-known illustration of this point is the much
greater probability of finding a positive effect (or finding a
larger effect) in randomized controlled trials where the in-
vestigators have a conflict of interest, either because the
trial is funded by pharmaceutical companies or for other
reasons.18 This may often be the result of tweaking the ‘in-
puts’ of the trial rather than of outright fraud; this tweak-
ing is not fraudulent precisely because the data
underdetermine the very many decisions that trial
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designers have to make (meaning that more than one non-
equivalent set of these decisions is compatible with the
data).19 These decisions include choice of participants,
measurement instruments (such as questionnaires), time
periods and many other factors. Less transparently, scien-
tists make multiple humdrum decisions on a daily basis
about what techniques to employ, what ‘leads’ to follow,
when to look harder and when to stop; and these, too, can
influence the outcome.20 So the trial might yield a causal
conclusion, via a deductive inference, given a raft of as-
sumptions; but no matter how huge and sophisticated the
trial, the security of its conclusion is no better than the se-
curity of its assumptions. Furthermore, the possibility that
findings are due to chance can never be ignored, even at
P-values below some level whose basis may reflect a social
consensus2 among scientists in that discipline (in epidemi-
ology, 0.05; in physics, often 0.001); any such level is ul-
timately arbitrary from an objective point of view, and
lower P-values reduce but do not eliminate the possibility
of a chance finding.
These familiar points show that randomized controlled
trials do not constitute sufficient conditions for good
causal inference: the full sufficient condition includes a raft
of assumptions, which cannot be satisfied by specifying the
design of the trial, no matter how exactly. These points
apply equally to any proposed set of sufficient conditions
for the analysis of data from observational trials. In par-
ticular, they apply to the use of the general approach advo-
cated by the POA and the particular techniques associated
with it. We take the point of Daniel et al. that being forced
to state your assumptions is helpful,2 but we are not con-
vinced that the methods of the POA do in fact force epi-
demiologists to state all the relevant assumptions. The
assumption that they suffice to enumerate the assumptions
could itself be dangerous, since it obscures the fact that
other assumptions remain unspecified.
Nonetheless we acknowledge that making even a subset
of our assumptions clear can be very useful. Our problem
is not with that exercise, but with the temptation to think
that by stating some of our assumptions more clearly, we
have successfully formalized the entire inferential process.
Daniel et al. say that: ‘Objective science eventually calls for
a formal theory and approach. We view the [POA] as pre-
cisely offering formal tools to investigate cause-effect rela-
tionships.’2 They concede that inference to the best
explanation (IBE) guides the application of these methods,
by which they appear to mean that IBE helps us decide
which questions to investigate. However, they believe that
intuition breaks down under certain circumstances, and
thus: ‘There is no question, in our opinion, that a formal
theory is needed to guide data analysis.’2 Science may in-
deed seek objectivity, and for this reason a deductive
method for causal inference is indeed highly desirable. But
this does not mean that it is possible: we cannot have one
just because we decide we need one. Causal conclusions do
not follow deductively from data without a strong set of
auxiliary assumptions, and (as just discussed) these as-
sumptions are themselves not deductive consequences of
the data. A formal method may indeed be extremely help-
ful, provided that its significance is not misunderstood and
its dependence on supporting assumptions not forgotten.
We are also concerned about policy makers who may
misunderstand what scientists say. If it is claimed that
causal inference has been formalized and it is not explained
that the formalism, powerful as it may be, is only as good
as the assumptions that support it, then causal conclusions
will look surer (‘more objective’) than they really are.
We suspect that VanderWeele and many others would
agree that the POA does not amount to a fully logically
sufficient set of conditions for inferring causality from em-
pirical data. The second sense in which ‘sufficient’ might
be intended is the informal sense, the more casual, normal
usage: something like ‘enough, in the circumstances, to
warrant a causal inference’, or perhaps ‘sufficient for an in-
ductive inference to a causal conclusion’. If the former
kind was logical or deductive sufficiency, we can call this
inductive sufficiency. The claim that there are inductively
sufficient conditions for causal inference is plausible.
However, it is not news. It amounts to saying ‘causal infer-
ence is possible for us’, or ‘sometimes, we can make causal
inferences’. This is true, and has been true since the Stone
Age. It remains a mystery exactly how inductive inference
is possible, given our inability either to justify or even to
accurately describe it. However, it certainly appears that
we have made successful causal inferences on many
occasions.
We suspect that the assertion that ‘sometimes, we can
make causal inferences’ is much weaker than what POA
advocates would intend, and is also weaker than what
readers would naturally read into it. We suspect that the
intention is to indicate that the POA has contributed a set
of logically sufficient conditions, where before we did not
have such a set. We do not accept this. We agree that the
POA has contributed to our causal inference abilities, by
contributing to the large and diverse set of inductively suf-
ficient conditions for causal inference; but we maintain
that it has not contributed logically sufficient conditions,
and that the inductively sufficient conditions it has contrib-
uted join a large array of pre-existing conditions of this
kind. Thus we see a risk that claims of this kind may give a
false sense of progress.
The fact that there are inductively sufficient condi-
tions for causal inference certainly has not been made
true by the advent of the POA or any other recent
1844 International Journal of Epidemiology, 2016, Vol. 45, No. 6
developments. Probably what POA advocates would
want to say in response is that POA represents a devel-
opment or an advance in our abilities to make causal in-
ference. We tend to agree and we made a similar claim
in our original paper, arguing that the POA represented
a set of extremely useful conceptual and methodological
tools that may help causal inference in particular cir-
cumstances. However, this simply is not equivalent to
the stronger (logical) sense of sufficiency, and we suspect
that the stronger sense is often in the background of dis-
cussions of the POA and supplies some of the associated
glamour and excitement, as well as a false sense of
certainty.
A3. The identification/estimation distinction
One innovation of this debate has been the introduction,
or at least the clarification, of a distinction between two
kinds of causal inference. Causal identification occurs
when we identify some exposure as among the causes of
the outcome. Causal estimation occurs when we seek to
quantify the contribution of some exposure to an outcome.
One of us (A.B.) trained with the late Peter Lipton, a
philosopher of science famous for turning ‘Inference to the
Best Explanation’ from a slogan into a detailed (partial)
theory of inductive inference, and who emphasized the im-
portance of contrasts in causal explanation and hence (via
IBE) in causal inference.21,22 One of his mottos was:
‘When faced with a contradiction, make a distinction.’
Our view of the distinction between identification and esti-
mation is that it represents a way for the POA to maintain
that counterfactual dependence of certain kinds is neces-
sary for certain kinds of causal inference, even though it is
not necessary for causal inference in general. We are uncer-
tain whether it is useful in any other way, besides carving
out a domain in which the POA may seek to assert neces-
sary conditions on a certain demarcated subset of causal
inferences, namely those relating to the quantitative esti-
mation of causal effects. Below (in section B2) we express
our view that even causal estimation is the result of an in-
ferential process involving the integration of many pieces
of evidence from many sources.
A4. The POA’s semantic stance on estimation
Characteristic of the POA is an insistence that it is not
meaningful, or at least not clear, to make quantitative at-
tributions of causal responsibility without properly specify-
ing the counterfactual contrast against which the
contribution of the putative cause to the actual effect is
quantified. This is a semantic stance (concerning the mean-
ingfulness of certain claims) but it has epistemological con-
sequences (consequences for what we can know).
Meaningless claims cannot be true (or false), and thus can-
not be known; nor can they be the conclusions of any infer-
ence (since an inference ‘to a claim’ is to the truth of that
claim). Thus (iv) implies that putative causal inferences are
mistaken if they attempt to estimate causal effects without
adequately specifying counterfactual contrasts. We regard
(iv) as a useful and important point, and a real contribu-
tion to epidemiological thinking. Perhaps it ought to be ob-
vious, but if one is going to specify how much of a
difference something makes, one needs to be clear about
the baseline against which the difference is being
measured.
However, we do note two points of caution about
(iv). First, we suppose that ‘adequately defined’ is under-
stood in a suitably liberal way, and not as implying the uni-
versal use of the set of methods closely associated with the
POA/RPOA. Second, necessity and sufficiency must not be
mixed up. We remain of the view expressed above (in A2)
that there are not logically sufficient conditions for any in-
ductive inference. Adequately defined contrasts are neces-
sary to make sense of estimates of effects of potential
causes. However, the fact that we have adequately defined
our contrasts does not by itself guarantee that our causal
estimate is correct, either in its quantity or in the underly-
ing causal relationship it purports to measure. Background
information and knowledge from other sources is indis-
pensable, a point we return to in B2 below.
A5. The RPOA’s restriction to interventions
More problematic is the insistence that ‘causal effects can-
not be defined . . . in the absence of well-defined interven-
tions’.6 This is the key element of the RPOA, in contrast
with the POA, and the one that we believe is most prob-
lematic. We doubt the usefulness of the term ‘intervention’,
and, as we emphasize in our authors’ reply23 to a letter by
VanderWeele et al.,24 the term itself has not been defined
by those who rely on it. In epidemiological circles, ‘inter-
vention’ usually denotes a human act of some kind.
Therefore if we have misunderstood, this at least partly re-
flects the vagueness with which the term ‘intervention’ has
been used. The commentaries universally argue that ‘inter-
vention’ ought not to be interpreted so as to indicate hu-
manly feasible interventions. Even so clarified, we reject
the claim that interventions are necessary or sufficient for
the adequate specification of counterfactual contrasts. In
our original article we said: ‘The deeper problem with the
RPOA concerns its reliance on the notion of a well-
specified intervention, whether humanly feasible or not.’9
Thus we made clear that our criticisms extended beyond a
commitment to human feasibility. None of the respondents
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has addressed our remaining criticisms of the notion of
intervention in general as it appears in the RPOA, focusing
instead on our criticisms of humanly feasible interventions.
We take this opportunity to seek to further clarify why we
think that interventions (human or otherwise) should not
have an essential or privileged place in the POA.
In our original paper we identified three difficulties with
the role assigned to interventions by the RPOA: (a) merely
specifying an intervention is not sufficient for adequately
specifying a causal contrast; (b) one may not always be able
to determine in advance whether an intervention is suffi-
ciently well-specified; and (c) specifying an intervention is
not necessary for adequately specifying a causal contrast.
The first point (a) is illustrated by the interventions in
Herna´n and Taubman’s paper.6 ‘One hour of strenuous ex-
ercise per day’ includes many different forms of exercise
which may have very different effects on mortality, show-
ing that specifying an intervention does not necessarily get
you all the way to a well-specified contrast. The interven-
tion itself needs to be adequately specified; by introducing
the notion of intervention, the RPOA has just pushed the
problem of defining ‘adequate specification’ back a step,
and not solved it.
The second point (b) is essentially a conditional: if spe-
cifying interventions were necessary, we would be ham-
strung in many cases, because we would be unable to say
whether the study we were about to embark on satisfied
this criterion or not without actually doing the study. In
advance of a study, we may not know whether different
forms of exercise affect mortality differently. More plaus-
ibly, we may not know (or may learn more about) which
properties of the exercise matter (intensity, duration, dom-
inant energy system, time of day, etc.).
The third point (c) is that specifying interventions is, in
fact, not necessary for specifying counterfactual contrasts.
Specifying an intervention to counterfactually alter a
causal variable is not the same thing as specifying a differ-
ent value for that variable. Specifying an intervention to
bring about a counterfactual value of the causal variable is
not necessary for specifying a counterfactual value of the
causal variable. This is clear even within the POA. As
Bollen and Pearl note, ‘The essential ingredient of caus-
ation is responsiveness, namely the capacity to respond to
variations in other variables, regardless of how those vari-
ations came about.’7
We stand by our three original objections to the RPOA,
which have not been addressed in any of the commentaries.
We suspect that this may partly be because of a tendency
to mix up three distinct things: the causes of an exposure
of interest; the effect of the exposure on the outcome of
interest; and the effects on the outcome of interest of inter-
ventions on the exposure. For example, obesity: may have
many causes, such as genetic factors, diet, exercise habits,
sleep patterns, etc; may have effects on mortality; and may
respond to different potential interventions which may
have different effects on mortality, both through their dif-
fering effects on obesity and their different direct effects on
mortality. None of this means that obesity is a ‘composite
exposure’ as VanderWeele suggests.4 Rather it is a single
cause of mortality which can be caused by multiple factors
and can be reduced by multiple interventions. Of course, it
could be argued that different types of obesity carry differ-
ent mortality risks, and that we should study more specific
subtypes of obesity, but this applies to most exposures. We
are always estimating average population effects, for ex-
ample the average effect on mortality of a BMI of 35 vs 25,
or the average effect on mortality of smoking 10 pack-
years vs 0 pack-years. This does not depend on specifying
interventions.
Moreover, even if we are seeking to intervene on obesity
to reduce mortality, the estimates we can obtain of the ef-
fects of obesity itself remain useful and provide upper lim-
its to what can theoretically be achieved by public health
interventions.25 Thus, estimating the overall causal effect
of obesity is important in itself; furthermore, this is usually
the only relevant effect that can be estimated in epidemio-
logical studies—information on specific hypothetical inter-
ventions is usually not available. So we can estimate (or
attempt to estimate) the causal effect(s) of obesity, and we
may also wish to estimate (or attempt to estimate) the ef-
fects of specific interventions to reduce obesity. The former
information is usually available in epidemiological studies,
whereas the latter is usually not.
Herna´n and Taubman mix up these issues in their
paper.6 They point out that it is difficult to understand what
‘excess mortality attributable to obesity’ means unless one
specifies a counterfactual contrast class in which the excess
mortality is absent. However, their proposed contrast class
is one in which an intervention is introduced on an obese
population to reduce its obesity. In fact, the counterfactual
contrast of interest in estimating the effect of obesity is not
between a population with too much obesity and one whose
distribution of BMI has been manipulated towards greater
average leanness by a particular intervention. The latter is
the relevant counterfactual contrast for determining the ef-
fect of an intervention on obesity.
The relevant counterfactual contrast for determining the
effect of obesity is better approximated by the general ques-
tion ‘What if there never was obesity?’ (or more precisely,
‘What if this group of people had always had a BMI of 25
rather than 35?’), in the same way that the effect of smoking
is better approximated by ‘What if people never smoked?’
(and not ‘What if they gave up?’—that helps us estimate the
effect of giving up, not the effect of smoking itself).
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In fact, for all estimations about factors that we believe
to be causal, it is a truism that it might be unforeseeable
how a real life intervention might play out. Some drug
interventions for obesity have led to suicidal ideations and
suicide. The original interventions on hypercholesterol-
aemia using diet had very little effect—if any—but
epidemiologists continued to believe that hypercholesterol-
aemia was a cause, worthwhile to intervene upon; for that
same reason, the pharmaceutical industry sought for means
to influence it, which led to the advent of statins. Thus,
what type of causal assessment is needed will depend on
the state of the question: in the beginning it is the likely ef-
fect of removing a cause (by unspecified means); later, spe-
cific interventions might be considered.
Of course, all of the above is highly contextual. For
some counterfactual contrasts one expects very little con-
founding, such as genetic differences in populations where
the genetic differences can be regarded as being random, or
when studying unexpected and unpredictable adverse ef-
fects of medications. Other counterfactual contrasts may
always need intervention studies (or a search for
intervention-like situations) because the confounding of
the counterfactual contrast is believed to be intractable,
such as confounding by indication in drug treatment, being
a vegetarian or religious affiliation. Most counterfactual
contrasts will be in between these extremes.26 Finally, there
is a distinction between cure and prevention: the cure of an
acute myocardial infarction is (among other measures)
stenting, which aims at the last part of the causal chain and
has little to do with the original population causes; preven-
tion of a second myocardial infarction, however, aims at
causes ‘upstream’ in that chain.
Finally, the significance of mixing up the effect of an
exposure with the effect of an intervention on the exposure is
particularly apparent when one considers politically import-
ant exposures like race and gender. The effect of being a
woman on income is not well approximated by the effect of
undergoing a gender reassignment process. Far from clarify-
ing the study of such exposures, the notion of an intervention
actually introduces an opportunity for further confusion.
B. ‘Soft’ issues
Having set out our stance on the substantial matters arising
in the course of the debate, we turn now to various ‘soft’
issues which, as stated before, may actually be more im-
portant in the development of the science.
B1. Straw man or bendy man?
A repeated criticism from the various commentators is that
we have created a ‘straw man’. We have supposedly set up
an inaccurate caricature of the RPOA approach, and then
criticized this caricature. We address this point reluctantly,
because it is hard to do so without sounding argumenta-
tive, but we feel we must address it. We are left with the
feeling that every time we attempt to address some of the
more extreme views of the RPOA, we are told that remarks
have been taken out of context or misunderstood (by us).
One of the critical commentaries is structured largely
around our ‘misconceptions’, as if the whole thing were an
unfortunate misunderstanding.2 In fact, the quotes that we
have taken from Herna´n, VanderWeele and others are not
cherry picked or taken out of context, but have counterparts
in many papers on these issues. We revisit some of them here
just to show, once again, that our interlocutors have commit-
ted themselves to the RPOA and moreover have often
assumed ‘intervention’ as implying human feasibility, despite
their different point of view in the commentaries. Rather
than a straw man, we are dealing with a ‘bendy man’.
VanderWeele has endorsed the RPOA, giving a central
role to interventions, for example:
There has thus been considerable debate as to what, if
anything, is meant by the effects of race. The formal
causal inference literature has generally conceived of
causal effects as a comparison between counterfactuals
or potential outcomes. Often in the causal inference lit-
erature, the position is taken that it is meaningful to
speak of a contrast of counterfactual outcomes only to
the extent that we can specify an intervention.15
This is an endorsement of (v) above, that is, of the
RPOA.
VanderWeele has also endorsed an interpretation of
‘intervention’ that is restricted to humanly feasible inter-
ventions, in this passage (which follows directly from the
previous):
Sometimes this position is associated with the slogan
‘no causation without manipulation.’ A literature has
begun to develop considering this issue of ill-defined
‘treatment’ or nonmanipulable exposures in more de-
tail. However, race is not something we can intervene
on, and the associated counterfactual queries gener-
ally strike researchers as meaningless. The question of
what would a black person’s health outcome have been
had they been white seems like a strange one to pose. It
is sometimes cautioned that one should not discuss the
effects of race except in very special circumstances
when such effects do correspond to a manipulable vari-
able such as in the examples above of job application
studies.15
Assuming that we are human, the phrase ‘race is not
something we can intervene on’ indicates that ‘intervene’ is
being used to imply humanly feasibility. The passage (and
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the paper as a whole) makes no mention of the idea that an
intervention might be humanly impossible. Moreover, it is
not possible to make sense of this passage if ‘intervention’
is not supposed to imply human feasibility. This is because
the human impossibility of intervening on race is used as
the motivation for the paper’s project of finding mediating
variables for the effects of race. Drop that implication, and
the entire paper loses its stated motivation. (Others might
be supplied post hoc, but the one that was actually sup-
plied falls away.) The analytical solutions of the paper are
imaginative; what we are concerned with is the rationale
for proposing them. Elsewhere, humanly feasible interven-
tions are identified as good things to investigate without
any particular reason given:
Essentially, we give a plausible causal interpretation of
the race coefficient by considering how much a racial in-
equality could be eliminated by intervening on a differ-
ent variable, namely socioeconomic status, which may
be more manipulable than race.15
We can think of two reasons for which one might prefer
a more manipulable variable. One is that, for practical pur-
poses, one may want to manipulate it. This is benign. But
the other possible reason is that one can only meaningfully
assign a causal effect to a (humanly) manipulable variable.
This is not benign, in our view. The trouble is that the two
reasons are not distinguished; indeed, no reason is given
for seeking manipulable variables.
This leaves us with unanswered questions. Why are
these authors looking for manipulable factors? Who is the
intended manipulator—governments, individuals, corpor-
ations . . . ? Is this just a pragmatic preference? Is there any-
thing wrong conceptually with just attributing effects to
race? Why do we need to tie ourselves into knots trying to
decide whether a particular counterfactual contrast can be
conceived in terms of interventions? This line of thought
leads to strange differentiations. For example, sex can be
considered as a cause (because it is randomized at concep-
tion), and genetics may or may not be considered a cause,
whereas race/ethnicity cannot be (or at least its causal ef-
fect cannot be estimated) although the effects of the medi-
ators of this non-cause can be estimated.15 These
differentiations are bound to seem strange unless more is
said about the practical reason for focusing on manipu-
lable variables, if there is one; and from the theoretical
point of view of achieving causal understanding, the differ-
entiations appear arbitrary.
It is much more straightforward to assume that causes
include (but are not restricted to) any well-defined counter-
factual contrast, and that we can attempt to estimate the
causal effect of any such contrast (while attempting to con-
trol for confounding etc.). It is then straightforward to con-
sider the subgroup of causes for which interventions can be
defined, if one so wishes. VanderWeele concedes this point
in his commentary, albeit with different terminology from
ours, writing: ‘The potential outcomes approach . . . is con-
cerned with a subset of causal questions that can be defined
as a contrast of hypothetical interventions.’4 This is the
first time, to our knowledge, that this point has been expli-
citly conceded in the various discussions of this topic.
We have also encountered the sentiment that there are
no substantial disagreements between our views and those
of R/POA adherents, once things are clarified: that it is all
a ‘storm in a teacup’. We believe that it is now even clearer
what the disagreements are. In particular, we reject the
claim that it is necessary to specify an intervention (human
or otherwise) when seeking to estimate a causal effect.
Herna´n, on the other hand, sees the specifying of interven-
tions as obligatory for calculating causal effects: ‘Causal ef-
fects cannot be defined, much less computed, in the
absence of well defined interventions.’6 To us, the word
‘defined’ appears to rule out all causal talk, not just the es-
timation (or computation) of quantified causal effects. But
even if this sentence is understood as limited to quantita-
tive estimate of causal effect (a limitation to our knowledge
only explicitly introduced in the commentaries on our ori-
ginal paper), we do not accept this claim. We may accept
an adequate specification of counterfactual contrasts as ne-
cessary for meaningful quantitative estimates, but we do
not regard the specification of interventions as necessary
for specifying counterfactual contrasts.
In places, the specification of an intervention appears to
be the same thing as the specification of a counterfactual
contrast: ‘A proper definition of causal effect requires well-
defined counterfactual outcomes, that is, a widely shared
consensus about the relevant interventions.’8 Here the two
stances are conflated—POA and RPOA. We suspect that
this conflation of the two stances is one source of the feel-
ing we have sometimes encountered that we do not really
disagree. We hope that the difference is now clearer.
At other times, there is an appeal to usefulness. For
example:
The crucial question is then this: What is the point of
estimating a causal effect that is not well defined? The
resulting relative risk estimate will not be helpful to ei-
ther scientists, who will be unable to relate it to a mech-
anism, or policy makers, who will be unable to translate
it into effective interventions.8
We see this appeal to usefulness as a different point, one
that we addressed in our original paper.9 It has not been
commented on subsequently, so we assume that what we
say about it has been accepted—that causal knowledge can
be useful regardless of whether it concerns interventions.
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Nonetheless we have reiterated in the present paper that
causal knowledge without specified interventions can be
useful: we provide several examples in our original paper,9
and we reiterate this position in A5 above.
So we disagree that we have set up a straw man, and we
also disagree that we agree with our interlocutors on all main
points, as these are expressed in previous writings. To our
knowledge, the commentary by VanderWeele4 and the letter
by VanderWeele et al.24 are the first occasions on which it
has been explicitly conceded that the R/POA approach does
not address all causes of disease, and does not constitute a
general and complete theory of causal inference. We agree
with these comments and are grateful for the clarification.
B2. Science as a process
There may be differences of perspective on causal inference
and on science itself underlying the specific differences
described above. We believe that causality is not a statis-
tical property, but a theoretical entity. Saying that a certain
relationship is causal amounts to asserting a scientific the-
ory, even if it is a simple, localized theory. As for any scien-
tific theory, we believe that the scientific discovery of
causality is not a single-study phenomenon, and that epi-
demiological research is a process whereby a variety of
types of evidence are gathered.
We appreciate that all the main contributors to this de-
bate have now explicitly said that they accept that a variety
of types of evidence from multiple studies is important. But
the points about sufficiency of circumstances for causal in-
ference (raised above in A2) sit uneasily with this avowal.
Moreover, the actual methodological focus of the R/POA
is on inference within a single study, or sets of studies.
Methods for reconciling different kinds of evidence are
rarely, if ever, mentioned.
The process of discovering a cause of disease unfolds dif-
ferently on each occasion, but there are some commonal-
ities. One pivotal way in which epidemiologists have been
able to generate ideas has been through their population
focus.27,28 Because populations are particular, time-bound,
local entities and not abstract theoretical entities, this means
that epidemiological discoveries often have a particularly
local, unrepeatable and sometimes even coincidental charac-
ter. It is the interaction between studies and ideas at the
population, individual and molecular levels which so often
produces an ongoing cascade of hypothesis generation and
testing. Ultimately, this may result in the formulation of
highly specific hypotheses that are suitable for testing in a
trial (e.g. hepatitis B virus is a cause of liver cancer), or for
the estimation of a precisely quantified effect. But this usu-
ally occurs at the end of a long process with many false
starts and blind alleys.
Furthermore, we would note that generalizability
should also be considered as a matter of scientific rather
than statistical inference,16,17,29 and that estimates from a
particular population may not apply to other populations
because of different distributions of effect modifiers (and
there will almost always be effect modification of the rela-
tive risk of risk difference or both,30 or the presence or ab-
sence of co-factors. Furthermore, the ‘effect estimates’
generated in epidemiological studies do not even provide
estimates of the probability of causation in the populations
under study,31 let alone in other populations. So the most
one can say is that if an exposure causes an increased risk
then one might expect it to also cause increased risks in
some, but not all, other populations. Thus even the estima-
tion of causal effects is not an exact quantitative science.
Thus we suggest that it is good practice to refrain from
calling any individual study’s estimate ‘causal’ even if it is a
randomized trial. It is the totality of the evidence that leads
to the verdict of causality. Causality is a scientific conclu-
sion, a theoretical claim, and as such transcends any individ-
ual study. Estimations either of counterfactual contrasts or
of interventions are interesting and important, but are often
local effects in a particular time, place and population. And
even these are not pure empirical findings, but are heavily
theory-laden. They are not read or calculated from data, but
inferred from it, and the inference depends upon a huge net-
work of background hypotheses and scientific knowledge—
even in the case where an estimate arises from a single study.
Thus, causality is not a statistical concept whose presence or
absence can be determined by statistical analysis of a set of
data. It is a theoretical concept, even when invoked in quan-
titative estimates for particular populations. As with any sci-
entific theoretical finding, we infer causal conclusions
(including estimations of causal effect) as the result of an in-
ductive inference, considering all the available evidence.
Of course, a single study can be decisive in some cir-
cumstances but not because of its innate power to ‘prove’
causation: the context plays a crucial role in determining
the significance of evidence. As we have emphasized previ-
ously,9 a piece of evidence might be very weak taken on its
own, yet still be the keystone in a larger argument for caus-
ality. While our interlocutors have acknowledged some of
these points, we nonetheless maintain that there is a funda-
mental difference in emphasis between this approach to
causal inference and that of the R/POA.
Conclusion
So where does this leave us? Is this just a storm in a teacup?
In our view it is not, because it reflects two very different
visions of what epidemiology is, how it should be taught
and how it should develop. We believe that epidemiology
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is a science with a particular subject matter to which we
can apply a variety of methods. In the R/POA, we perceive
a view of epidemiology as a set of methods which are then
applied to those scientific questions which can be answered
with these particular methods.
Epidemiology identifies potential causes of disease in
populations. It is part of a larger undertaking, together with
other medical and social sciences ranging from biochemical
laboratory sciences to anthropology, that (unlike many
RCTs) attempts to understand and explain the observed as-
sociations rather than simply estimate them. Explaining as-
sociations means obtaining understanding as to why the
associations occur. This can and often does lead to under-
standing why they may not occur (or may have different
strengths) in other populations. We see quantitative causal
estimation as an important part of epidemiology, but it is
just one aspect. We understand the appeal of the elegant
mathematical tools and methods of the R/POA, but we do
not believe that this is what epidemiology has been restricted
to, nor what it is, nor what it ought to be.
Our aim has been to ‘allow’ all of the different causal
questions that epidemiologists may wish to ask, and to
consider the issues involved in answering them. Scientific
enquiry, including physics, biology, and epidemiology,
starts with a particular aspect of reality (matter, life, the
distribution and determinants of disease in human popula-
tions) and questions about this reality (e.g. ‘What are the
causes of asthma?’ or ‘Why is lung cancer increasing?’). In
seeking to answer these questions, each science then simul-
taneously develops a methodology that seems appropriate,
by a kind of ‘reflective equilibrium’ process:31 methods
that do not yield tenable results are rejected; and those that
seem fruitful are retained and tested against each
other.33,34 Every science must restrict the questions that its
participants can ask and the methods used to answer them:
otherwise, all causal inquiries would end up studying the
Big Bang. However, over-restriction results in exclusion of
areas of potential knowledge.
We conclude that an inclusive approach to scientific en-
quiry in epidemiology, which we call pragmatic pluralism, is
not only appropriate but necessary. We agree with Bollen
and Pearl7 that the essential ingredient of causation is re-
sponsiveness to variations in values of variables—however
this is caused. In principle, all of types of causes of health
states are susceptible to causal investigation and causal ver-
dicts by epidemiologists, not just causes and situations
amenable to certain methods. Furthermore, the issues in es-
tablishing causality for a particular factor are often highly
hypothesis- and context-specific. Perhaps the only general
conclusion that can be drawn is that any attempt at causal
assessment involves integrating evidence of a variety of types
from a variety of sources; no single study can establish caus-
ality for any of these types of causes, just as there is no single
study design (not even an RCT) which can establish causal-
ity in itself.
Thus we hold that epidemiology, like other sciences,
starts with its subject matter (distribution and determin-
ants of the health of populations), and that introductory
epidemiology courses should likewise start with this sub-
ject matter. As other sciences do, epidemiology should use
a variety of study designs and types of data to attempt to
identify causes.22 Although some approaches may be more
valid in specific circumstances, such as randomization in
the presence of strong confounding by indication, there are
no definitive ‘rules’ as to which types of evidence are ad-
missible and which are not. In our original paper,9 we give
the example of the crucial role of time trend evidence in
the debates about smoking and lung cancer. Time trend
data are not intrinsically strong data for causality, yet in
the context of the debate they proved crucial because they
effectively ruled out one credible competitor to the smok-
ing hypothesis (the constitutional hypothesis).
Moreover, putting all of the evidence together ultim-
ately remains an exercise in judgement. This judgement is
not formalizable, for reasons given in A2 above. Such
judgements may be aided by articulations such as those of
Bradford Hill35 and the US Surgeon General,36 but they
cannot be developed into fully formal tools because there
are no logically sufficient conditions for causal inference,
as discussed in A2 above. There is nothing unusual about
this: it applies to all sciences, since all empirical scientific
enquiry depends on inductive inference.19,22,37
In this context, the methods developed and proposed by
the various commentators on our paper are invaluable as
data analysis tools and as articulations which assist in the
structuring and expression of the act of judgement that is
at the heart of a causal inference. But these methods, and
the principles that are often espoused along with them, do
not define epidemiology. Rather, they are a set of useful
tools which can be used alongside other approaches.
We believe that the activity of synthesizing evidence
from multiple sources to arrive at an informed judgment is a
much broader one than the estimation of the magnitude of
causal effects from a single study or group of similar studies.
Most of our commentators have now explicitly acknowl-
edged this. But we reiterate our view that the effect estima-
tion of potential interventions has been almost exclusively
emphasized by the RPOA, at the cost of the wider set of
causal inference activities. Calling a collection of new ideas,
however worthwhile, ‘causal inference’ is misleading if only
a small part of causal inference is treated. Our fear is that
the messy, informal but very important expertise of doing
epidemiology might be lost or diminished, given the intellec-
tual appeal of the RPOA’s formalism and the lack of
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accompanying caveats about its limitations. We hope that
this exchange of views has helped to clarify the strengths of
these new methods as major contributions to causal infer-
ence, although emphasizing that they constitute just part,
not the totality, of this field.
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